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Abstract. Mix nets are often used to provide privacy in modern security
protocols, through shuffling. Some of the most important applications,
such as secure electronic voting, require mix nets that are verifiable. In
the literature, numerous techniques have been proposed to make mix
nets verifiable. Some of them have also been employed for securing real
political elections.
With the looming possibility of quantum computers and their threat
to cryptosystems based on classical hardness assumptions, there is sig-
nificant pressure to migrate mix nets to post-quantum alternatives. At
present, no verifiable and practical post-quantum mix net with external
auditing is available as a drop-in replacement of existing constructions.
In this paper, we give the first such construction.
We propose a verifiable decryption mix net which solely employs practi-
cal lattice-based primitives. We formally prove that our mix net provides
a high level of verifiability, and even accountability which guarantees
that misbehaving mix servers can also be identified. Verification is ex-
ecuted by a (temporarily trusted) public auditor whose role can easily
be distributed. To demonstrate practicality for real-world systems, we
provide detailed performance benchmarks on our stand-alone implemen-
tation based only on the most conservative lattice hardness assumptions.
Keywords: lattice-based · verifiability · accountability · mix net · e-
voting
1 Introduction
Mix nets are indispensable building blocks of many secure e-voting systems. Es-
sentially, a mix net consists of a sequence of mix servers which take as input
the encrypted messages provided by the senders (e.g., the voters’ ballots), se-
cretely shuffle them, and eventually output the permutated plain messages (e.g.,
votes). Unless all mix servers are corrupted, the mixing breaks the individual
connections between the senders and their revealed messages in the output. In
the context of e-voting, this property guarantees vote privacy.
However, for secure e-voting, it is also important to ensure that the voters’
intent be reflected correctly in the election result, even if the mix servers are
corrupted and actively try to tamper with the votes. Therefore, the employed
mix net must be verifiable to guarantee that manipulating the senders’ input,
and generally incorrect mixing, can be detected. Moreover, in order to deter
parties from misbehaving in the first place, accountability is often also desirable.
This stronger form of verifiability provides identification of misbehaving parties
and adjudication of possible disputes. In the literature, numerous mix nets [1,
2, 4, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 19–21, 24, 28, 29, 32–34, 36–38] have been proposed that
aim to achieve verifiability and, in some cases, accountability. Some of them have
also been used for securing real political elections (see, e.g., [12, 35]).
With more and more powerful quantum computers on the horizon (see,
e.g., [3]), it is important to protect mix nets even when actively targeted by
quantum attackers, either contemporary or future. Due to the stark possibility
that future quantum attackers could retrospectively break vote privacy, there is
significant pressure to employ verifiable post-quantum mix nets already today.
Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, only a single verifiable mix net
scheme [24], named sElect, has been proposed so far that could employ practi-
cal post-quantum, e.g., lattice-based, cryptosystems. The unique characteristic
of sElect, in contrast to all other known verifiable mix nets, is to avoid (zero-
knowledge) proofs of correct decryption, for which, at present, there exist no
practical solutions whose security can be reduced to hardness assumptions over
lattices (see Section 2 for more details). Alas, although sElect is provably secure,
its security relies on the assumption that the senders/voters themselves verify
the correctness of the final outcome. While this assumption is reasonable for
some election scenarios, it cannot be justified in general; in particular, recourse
and adjudication in case of voter-detected fraud is problematic.
Therefore, it is still an open problem to construct a practical and provably
secure mix net with external auditing that can defend against quantum attacks.
Our contributions. In this paper, we present the first highly efficient and prac-
tically realizable lattice-based decryption mix net that provides a high level of
verifiability and even accountability. Verification is completely executed by a
(temporarily trusted) public auditor whose role can easily be distributed. This
structure is the same as the one of the prominent randomized partial checking
(RPC) technique [20] which was, for instance, used for elections in the Australian
state of Victoria [12].
To be more precise, our mix net employs a generalized version of the trip
wire technique that was, in a specific variant, originally employed in the mix
net by Khazaei et al. [21] as a subroutine. At a high level, in this technique,
the input to the mix net consists of the real input messages plus a number of
trip wire messages which to a mix server are indistinguishable from the real
ones. Now, if a mix server wants to manipulate the outcome, it faces the risk
of “touching” at least one trip wire, in which case the mix server would be
caught cheating. In contrast to the specific variant in the mix net by Khazaei
et al. [21], where each mix server can only inject a single trip wire in order to
be able to guarantee correctness of the verification (which furthermore requires
a proof of correct decryption), we depart from this as follows. First, we do not
assume that the mix servers themselves inject the trip wires to “verify each
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other”, but place that responsibility on a number of public auditors. Just one
of these auditors needs to be trusted, and in fact only temporarily, because
each auditor opens its inner state once mixing has finished—which incidentally
greatly simplifies adjudication in case of dispute, and could not be done to the
mixers themselves. Second, each auditor does not inject just a single but many
trip wires, so that the probability of being caught cheating can be made very
high even for manipulating just a few messages. Trip wires are cost effective, and
since we further use only the most basic and black-box cryptographic primitives
(namely, public-key encryption and digital signatures), the resulting mix net
can be run with extremely efficient (lattice-based) primitives that more than
compensate for the trip wires’ overhead compared to ZKP-based approaches.
Altogether, our contributions are as follows:
1. We first discuss the unique constraints that come into play when building
mix nets with quantum resistance, and related works (Section 2).
2. We describe how to extend an arbitrary plain (i.e., unverifiable, proof-less)
decryption mix net (Section 3) with our general version of the trip wire
technique (Section 4).
3. We precisely characterize how a decryption mix net with trip wires provides
a high level of verifiability and even accountability (Section 5). A formal
proof is provided in our technical report [7].
4. We instantiate the generic trip wire decryption mix net using practical lattice-
based cryptography from conservative hardness assumptions (plain LWE).
We have created a self-contained optimized implementation of the lattice
construction, and provide detailed benchmarks that demonstrate its practi-
cality for real-world elections at a high level of security (Section 6).
5. We candidly discuss the general properties, benefits and drawbacks of trip
wire mix nets (Section 7) and conclude in Section 8.
2 Feasibility of Post-Quantum Secure Mixing
Existing mix nets can be divided into two classes: decryption mix nets and re-
encryption mix nets. In this section, we describe the main ideas of these two
different approaches, and explain why the re-encryption approach is currently
impractical for defending against quantum attackers.
In a decryption mix net, originally proposed by Chaum [8], an IND-CCA2
secure public-key encryption scheme is employed. Each mix server holds a pub-
lic/secret key pair. Each sender iteratively encrypts its input message under the
mix servers’ public keys in reverse order, forming a multi-layered onion. Mixing
starts with the first mix server, which “peels off” the outermost encryption layer,
shuffles the result, forwards it to the second mix server, and so on. Eventually, all
encryption layers have been removed and the plain input messages are published
in the resulting random order.
In a re-encryption mix net, originally proposed by Park et al. [30], an IND-
CPA secure public-key encryption scheme with re-encryption is employed. There
is one public key whose secret key shares are distributed among a number of
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trustees. Each sender encrypts its input message under this public key. Mixing
starts with the first mix server which re-encrypts its input ciphertexts, shuffles
the result, forwards it to the second mix server, and so on. Eventually, all re-
encrypted input ciphertexts are published in random order. Depending on the
application, the output ciphertexts are either decrypted by the trustees or not.
In their plain unverifiable modes, re-encryption mix nets are more lightweight
than decryption mix nets because input messages are not encrypted iteratively
but only once under a single public key. However, when verifiability in the pres-
ence of quantum attackers is required, the trade-offs get more complicated. In
general, there are two different approaches for making re-encryption mix nets
verifiable, namely, by using randomized partial checking (RPC) [20] or by a
proof of correct shuffle [1, 2, 4, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 19, 28, 29, 33, 34, 37]. On
the positive side, RPC could potentially be used for making a lattice-based re-
encryption mix net verifiable, for instance using one of three recently proposed
lattice-based proofs of correct shuffle [10, 11, 33], although it is unclear whether
or not these are practical. On the negative side, both proof-based approaches
merely guarantee that the output ciphertexts are in fact shuffled re-encryptions
of the input ciphertexts. In order to be useful for our motivating application, i.e.,
secure e-voting, we also have to decrypt the output ciphertexts verifiably. Un-
fortunately, to the best of our knowledge, no practical zero-knowledge proofs of
correct decryption for lattice-based encryption have been proposed so far, whose
security can itself be reduced to lattice-based hardness assumptions. Even with
recent developments on sublinear arguments from lattices [5], ZK proofs tend
to be, and will likely remain, much heavier and more cumbersome than simple
primitives such as public-key encryption based on comparable assumptions.
As the main purpose of our mix nets would be for quantum-secure e-voting
where integrity, performance and simplicity of implementation are paramount,
our best bet is to devise a lattice-based decryption mix net that provides external
auditability using only the simplest fastest primitives as building blocks.
3 Plain Decryption Mix Net
In this section, we first recall the main idea of a plain unverifiable decryption
mix net [8] and then precisely describe its protocol. In Section 4, we describe the
generic trip wire technique to endow a plain decryption mix net with correctness
verification (and external/third-party adjudication) of its outcome.
3.1 Idea
At a high level, a decryption mix net works as follows. It consists of a num-
ber of mix servers M1, . . . ,MnMS each of which holds a public/private (encryp-
tion/decryption) key pair (pkk, skk). Each sender iteratively encrypts its plain
input message m under the public keys pk1, . . . , pknMS of the mix servers in
reverse order, and submits the resulting “nested” ciphertext c to the first mix
server M1. The first mix server uses its secret key sk1 to “peel off” the outermost
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encryption layer of all input ciphertexts, then shuffles the decrypted messages,
and forwards the permutated list to the second mix server M2. The second mix
server uses its secret key sk2 to “peel off” the second encryption layer, then
shuffles the result, and so on. Eventually, the last mix server MnMS outputs all
the plain messages initially chosen by the senders in random order.
3.2 Protocol
We now precisely describe the protocol of a plain decryption mix net.
Protocol participants. A plain decryption mix net protocol is run among senders,
S1, . . . ,SnS , and mix servers, M1, . . . ,MnMS , using a public, append-only bulletin
board B.
Channels. For each sender Si, we assume that there is an authenticated channel
from Si to the bulletin board B. These channels ensure that only eligible senders
are able to submit their inputs.4
Cryptographic primitives. We use the following cryptographic primitives:
– An IND-CCA2-secure public-key encryption scheme E .5
– An EUF-CMA-secure signature scheme S.
Protocol overview. A protocol run consists of the following consecutive phases.
In the setup phase, parameters are generated. In the submission phase, the
senders generate and submit their input. In the mixing phase, the mix servers
collaboratively mix the input.
We now describe each of the protocol phases in more detail.
Setup phase. Each mix server Mk runs the key generation algorithm of the
digital signature scheme S to generate its public/private (verification/signing)
keys. The verification keys are published on the bulletin board B.
Each mix server Mk runs the key generation algorithm KeyGen of the public-
key encryption scheme E to generate its public/private (encryption/decryption)
key pair (pkk, skk), and posts its public key pkk on the bulletin board B.
Submission phase. Each sender Si iteratively encrypts its secret input mi under
the mix servers’ public keys in reverse order, i.e., starting with the public key
pknMS of the last mix server MnMS to the public key pk1 of the first mix server
M1:
ci = Enc(pk1, (. . . ,Enc(pknMS ,mi))).
Mixing phase. The list of ciphertexts C0 ← (ci)nSi=1 posted by the senders on the
bulletin board B is the input to the mixing phase. Starting with the first mix
4 By assuming such authenticated channels, we abstract away from the exact method
the senders use to authenticate to the bulletin board; in practice, several methods
can be used, such as one-time codes, passwords, or external authentication services.
5 We also require that E , for every public-key and any two plaintexts of the same
length, always yields ciphertexts of the same length. This seems to be satisfied by
all practical schemes in existence, unless implemented with entropic compression.
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server M1, each mix server Mk takes Ck−1 as input and performs the following
tasks:
1. Mk decrypts all ciphertexts in Ck−1 under its private key skk:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , nS} : C ′k[i]← Dec(skk, Ck−1[i])
2. Mk chooses a permutation πk over {1, . . . , nS} uniformly at random, and sets
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , nS} : Ck[πk(i)]← C ′k[i].
3. Mk posts Ck on the bulletin board B.
The output CnMS of the last mix server MnMS is the output of the mixing
phase. It equals (mπ(i))
nS
i=1, where π = πnMS ◦ . . . ◦ π1 is the overall permutation
of the mix net.
4 Trip Wire Technique
We describe how to extend a plain decryption mix net (Section 3) with trip
wires. We will show in Section 5 that the resulting mix net provides a high level
of verifiability and accountability in the presence of fully malicious mix servers.
Fig. 1: Examplified run of a decryption mix net with trip wires, where nAD = 3, nMS = 3,




At a high level, the trip wire technique works as follows. The plain decryption
mix net is extended with a number of auditors AD1, . . . ,ADnAD each of which
executes the submission program of the senders ntw times. For this purpose, ADj
chooses dummy input messages (e.g., 0l) and encrypts them in layers as a normal
user would. The resulting ciphertexts are called ADj ’s trip wires. Furthermore,
ADj stores the random coins that it has used to generate its ntw trip wires.
Now, the plain decryption mix net (with only “main mixing” servers for now)
is run with this extended set of inputs. Once mixing has finished, each auditor
ADj reveals its inner states, including its trip wires’ random coins. With this,
the traces of ADj ’s trip wires through the mix net can publicly be verified. If a
mix server Mk did manipulate one of these dummy traces, this can be detected,
and furthermore Mk can be held accountable through its digital signature (more
on this later).
Even though this high-level description gives some intuition on the “integrity
challenge” underlying the trip wires, verifiability is obviously not yet guaranteed:
1. At the start of the mix, it is clear which input ciphertexts belong to the
senders and which ones to the auditors. Hence, if the first mix server M1 is
malicious, then the adversary can completely manipulate the outcome of the
mix net without being detected.
2. In general, we cannot assume that the auditors are able to simulate the
senders’ message distribution. Therefore, realistically, the auditors’ and the
senders’ plaintext distributions are distinguishable. Now, recall that the last
mix server MnMS knows the final plaintext output before it publishes it.
Hence, if MnMS is malicious, then the adversary can undetectably manipulate
the outcome of the mix net.
We propose the following additional mechanisms to address the above problems:
1. Prior to the main mixing, the input ciphertexts are “pre-mixed” using the
same kind of plain decryption mix net, but now run by the auditors. This
phase is called explicit mixing (see below for the reason). Unless all auditors
are corrupted, it is no longer possible, for the original main mixing servers,
to distinguish between the senders’ ciphertexts and the auditors’ trip wires.
2. An additional layer of encryption (whose private key is secret-shared among
the auditors) is added directly to the plain input messages. This is called the
repetition layer. Unless all auditors are corrupted, the last mix server gets
to know only the still encrypted output.
Since secrecy of the explicit mixing and of the repetition layer is required
only during main mixing, these two phases can be verified explicitly once the
main mixing has finished. For this purpose, each auditor is supposed to reveal
its explicit-mixing secret key as well as its secret key share of the repetition
encryption layer after the final mix server has published its output.
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4.2 Protocol
In this section, we precisely describe how to extend a plain decryption mix net
(Section 3) with the trip wire technique.
To preserve readibility, we make the following implicit assumptions:
– Whenever a party (mix server or auditor) holding a verification/signing key
pair publishes information, it signs this data with its secret signing key.
– Whenever a mix server or an auditor deviates from its honest program in
an obvious way (e.g., refuses to participate, or publishes an invalid secret
key), then the protocol aborts immediately and the misbehaving party is
held accountable.
– In order to protect against replay attacks which may affect message privacy
of senders (see, e.g., [9]), ciphertext deduplication is always in effect, where
only the first instance of a multiply occurring ciphertext is retained.
Protocol participants. The set of protocol participants is extended by a number
of auditors AD1, . . . ,ADnAD .
Cryptographic primitives. We additionally use an IND-CCA2-secure (nAD, nAD)-
threshold public-key encryption scheme Ed.6
Setup phase. The following additional steps are executed.
Each auditor ADj runs the key generation algorithm of the digital signature
scheme S to generate its public/private (verification/signing) keys. The verifica-
tion keys are published on the bulletin board B.
Each auditor ADj runs the key generation algorithm KeyGen of the public-
key encryption scheme E to generate a public/private key pair (pkexplj , sk
expl
j ), and
posts the public key pkexplj on the bulletin board B.
Each auditor ADj runs the key share generation algorithm KeyShareGen of
the distributed public-key encryption scheme Ed to generate a public/private
key share pair (pkrepj , sk
rep
j ), and posts the public key share pk
rep
j on the bulletin
board B. From those, using the deterministic algorithm PublicKeyGen, everyone
can then compute the joint public key pkrep.
Altogether, the public parameters consist of the public keys pkexpl1 , . . . , pk
expl
nAD
for the explicit decryption mix net, the public keys pk1, . . . , pknMS for the main
decryption mix net, and the joint public key pkrep for the repetition encryption
layer.
Submission phase (senders). Each sender Si first encrypts its message mi under
the auditors’ joint public key pkrep:
crepi = Enc(pk
rep,mi).
After that, Si encrypts c
rep
i under the mix servers’ public keys pk1, . . . , pknMS
of the main decryption mix net in reverse order:
cmaini = Enc(pk1, (. . . ,Enc(pknMS , c
rep
i ))).
6 Note that to jointly decrypt a ciphertext in Ed, all secret key shares are required.
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Afterwards, Si encrypts c
main
i under the auditors’ public keys pk
expl
1 , . . . , pk
expl
nAD
of the explicit decryption mix net in reverse order:
cexpli = Enc(pk
expl




The resulting ciphertext ci ← cexpli is Si’s input to the mix net.
Submission phase (auditors). Each auditor ADj executes ntw times the senders’
submission steps described above, every time with (dummy) input message m =
0l (where l is the bit size of a sender’s message). We denote ADj ’s trip wire
ciphertexts by (cnS+(j−1)·ntw+l)
ntw
l=1. Furthermore, ADj stores the random coins
that were used to generate its trip wire ciphertexts.
Mixing phase. The input to the mixing phase is (ci)i∈Iexpl which consists of
(a subset of)7 the nS ciphertexts submitted by the senders and the nAD · ntw
ciphertexts submitted by the auditors. Then, the overall mixing phase consists
of two consecutive parts:
1. Explicit mixing: The auditors use their secret decryption keys skexpl1 , . . . ,
skexplnAD to run the plain decryption mix net (Section 3) with input (ci)i∈Iexpl . The
output of this mix net is (c̃maini )i∈Imain , where I
main ⊆ Iexpl.
2. Main mixing: The mix servers use their secret decryption keys sk1, . . . , sknMS
to run the plain decryption mix net (Section 3) with input (c̃maini )i∈Imain . The out-
put of this mix net is (c̃repi )i∈Irep , where I
rep ⊆ Imain.
Auditing phase. Each auditor ADj publishes its secret key sk
expl
j associated to
the explicit decryption mix net. With this, everyone can verify that the explicit
mixing was executed correctly. If verification fails, a misbehaving auditor is iden-
tified through its signature and the whole protocol stops.
After that, each auditor ADj publishes the random coins that it used to
create its trip wires. With this, everyone can verify the integrity of trip wires’
traces through the main decryption mix net. If verification fails, a misbehaving
mix server is identified and the whole protocol stops.
Final decryption phase. Each auditor ADj publishes its secret key share sk
rep
j
on the bulletin board B. Then, for each ciphertext c̃repi (i ∈ I rep), the decryption




i ). After that, the
decryption shares are combined to decrypt c̃repi : m̃i ← Dec(dec
rep




Alternatively, and more efficiently if the threshold encryption scheme supports
it (it normally would), the joint secret key skrep iz explicitly reconstituted from
the published secret key shares (skrepj )j∈[nAD] and from there using sk
rep each
ciphertext c̃repi is directly decrypted into m̃i.
The list of decrypted messages (m̃i)i∈Irep is the final outcome of the mix net.
5 Verifiability
In this section, we analyze verifiability of the decryption mix net with trip wires
in the generic verifiability framework by Küsters, Truderung, and Vogt [26]. We
7 Recall that ciphertext duplicates or invalid ciphertexts are continuously removed.
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briefly recall a specific instance of their general framework (Section 5.2) that was
previously applied to analyze a number of further mix nets [18, 24, 25, 27] and
that we now apply to the decryption mix net with trip wires (Section 5.3).
5.1 Notation
The decryption mix net extended with the trip wire technique can be modeled
in a straightforward way as a protocol P twDMN(nS, n
hon
S , nMS, nAD, ntw), described
next. The protocol participants consist of nS senders (in total), n
hon
S honest
senders, nMS mix servers, nAD auditors, a scheduler SC, and a public append-only
bulletin board B. The scheduler SC plays the role of the mix net authority and
schedules all other agents in a run according to the protocol phases. We assume
that SC and the bulletin board B are honest, i.e., they are never corrupted. While
SC is merely a virtual entity, in reality, B should be implemented in a distributed
way (see, e.g., [13, 22]). The parameter ntw denotes the number of trip wires per
auditor.
5.2 Verifiability Definition
Intuitively, a mix net is verifiable if an incorrect final outcome is not accepted.
More precisely, an outcome of the mix net should be rejected if it does not
correspond to the actual input as provided by the senders. However, such a näıve
definition of verifiability would be too strong for most reasonably verifiable mix
nets. Instead, the intuitive definition is judiciously adjusted as follows:
1. Completeness is relaxed such that an incorrect outcome may falsely be ac-
cepted with some (small) probability δ ∈ [0, 1]. This parameter is called the
verifiability tolerance of the mix net.
2. Many verifiable mix nets (besides the ones equipped with a proof of correct
shuffle) do not aim to ensure that all input messages are reflected correctly in
the final outcome but almost of them. Therefore, we allow for manipulating
a small number of k input messages. (Typically, the verifiability tolerance
δ = δk decreases when k increases.)
3. Since corrupted senders may not (necessarily) complain in case their mes-
sages were dropped or manipulated by a colluding mix net authority (e.g.,
mix server), it is often sufficient to guarantee the integrity of the final result
only w.r.t. the honest input messages (as long as no input message stuffing
by dishonest senders occurs.)
These refinements lead to the following expressive, widely applicable and
currently accepted definition of verifiability. Due to space limitations, we state
it informally, and refer to [26] for the complete formal definition.
Definition 1 (Verifiability (informal)). A mix net protocol P provides (δ, k)-
verifiability if and only if an outcome of the mix net is accepted with probability
at most δ in case more than k honest input messages were manipulated (or any
dishonest messages were inserted).
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5.3 Verifiability Result
We are now able to precisely state the verifiability level offered by the decryption
mix net with trip wires according to Definition 1. The level depends on the
number of honest senders nhonS and the number of dummy messages per auditor
ntw, as described in Section 5.1.
Assumptions. We prove the verifiability result under the following assumptions:
(V1) The public-key encryption scheme E is IND-CCA2-secure.
(V2) The (nAD, nAD)-threshold public-key encryption scheme Ed is IND-CCA2-
secure.
(V3) The signature scheme S is EUF-CMA-secure.
(V4) The scheduler SC, the bulletin board B, and at least one auditor are
honest.
(V5) For all honest senders and auditors, the length of the message plaintext
has the same size in each run of the protocol (given a security parameter).
(V6) For E and Ed, we require that for any two plaintexts of the same length,
their encryption always yields ciphertexts of the same length.
Our Result. Intuitively, the following theorem states that the probability that,
in a run of the trip wire decryption mix net, more than k honest sender inputs
have been manipulated, but the final result of this run is nevertheless accepted,
is bounded by a function δk(n
hon
S , ntw) which we can quantify.
Theorem 1 (Verifiability). Under the assumptions (V1) to (V6) stated above,
the decryption mix net protocol with trip wires P twDMN(nS, n
hon
S , nMS, nAD, ntw) is
(δk(n
hon
S , ntw), k)-verifiable, where
δk(n
hon







The main reasoning behind this theorem is as follows. Since the explicit mix-
ing and the shared decryption of the repetition layer are perfectly verifiable, an
adversary can only manipulate honest senders’ messages in the main mix net
without being detected. However, due to the IND-CCA2-security of the under-
lying public-key encryption schemes, the adversary has to do this manipulation
“blindly” as the nhonS + ntw ciphertexts related to the honest input parties (one
ciphertext for each of the nhonS honest senders plus ntw ciphertexts by the honest
auditor) are indistinguishable. Now, if an adversary wants to manipulate k + 1
honest inputs, the probability that he is not caught cheating is captured by the
following urn experiment. An urn contains nhonS white and ntw black balls, rep-
resenting honest messages and trip wires respectively. Upon picking k + 1 balls
from this urn without replacement, the probability that none of the removed











Importantly, for all k, the verifiability tolerance δk(n
hon




k+1 which converges exponentially fast to 0 in the number
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of manipulated honest inputs k. For example, if we choose ntw = nS, then the
adversary’s risk is more than 90% for manipulating more than 4 honest messages,
and even more than 99% for manipulating more than 7 honest messages.
Theorem 1 follows immediately from the even stronger result of accountabil-
ity which we state and formally prove in our technical report [7]. Precisely, we
show that a decryption mix net with trip wires even provides individual account-
ability. This security property not only guarantees that the correctness of the
mix net outcome can be verified and adjudicated externally, but also that mis-
behaving parties can be identified and held accountable. Since Küsters et al. [26]
proved that accountability is a stronger form of verifiability, the formal proof of
our accountability result [7] implies the verifiability result (Theorem 1) stated
above.
6 Implementation
In terms of efficiency, the core component of the verifiable mix net protocol is
the (post-quantum) IND-CCA2-secure public-key encryption scheme: this com-
ponent must be fast and robust enough to process thousands, possibly millions,
of untrusted encrypted ballots, and do so safely and efficiently. Decryption per-
formance is of particular importance since each mix server will be decrypting
(one layer of) the entire set of encrypted ballots, while encryption is naturally
done piecemeal in a distributed way by the individual voters. Encryption perfor-
mance will start to matter (for the auditors) if the number of trip wires is large,
or (for the voters) if there are many mix servers hence encryption layers.
6.1 Design
We implement essentially the textbook Regev scheme (technically its dual),
which is provably secure under the now-classic LWE hardness assumption [31].
Our implementation attempts to remain faithful to the theoretical scheme, but
rearranges it to optimize its computation. We merely summarize the salient
points in Appendix A, while referring the reader to standard texts or surveys
on lattice-based cryptography for background. We also elaborate on our imple-
mentation rationale in our technical report [7], in particular on why we refrained
from choosing one of the current NIST proposals.
6.2 Technical Details
The concrete IND-CCA2-secure scheme we implement is a hybrid consisting of
a lattice-based CCA2-secure KEM, combined with an AES256-based DEM with
MAC. The KEM closely follows the original Regev cryptosystem [31]. For effi-
ciency, much of the secret data is obtained from privately or randomly seeded
AES256-based PRNG, and likewise much of the public key is generated on the
fly from a publicly seeded AES128-based PRNG. The data is aligned and ordered
so as to maximize performance of decryption over that of encryption. Standard
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techniques are used to provide chosen-ciphertext security for each of the KEM
and the DEM, albeit only implicitly in the sense of [6], causing malformed cipher-
texts to decrypt indistinguishably randomly rather than be explicitly rejected.
Our implementation targets the 240-bit security level, and accordingly uses
240-bit or wider data paths everywhere including the KEM-crypted symmetric
session key and the DEM redundancy. As stated, we erred on the side of over-
shooting our target, and used lattices of dimension n = 1024, modulus q = 216
and sampler-mandated LWE discrete Gaussian noise σ ≈ 2, providing sufficient
headroom to reliably encode 5-bit payload per 16-bit ciphertext component.
These parameters are conservative but not normative, and were selected mainly
for the purpose of conducting a realistic performance evaluation.
As stated in the theoretical part of the paper, the final decryption (in the
repetition layer) does not need to operate as a true threshold scheme, as long as
the private key can be reconstituted from the revealed private-key shares. Regev
key generation supports this, by linearity of the public key in the private key.
We can thus reuse the same implementation for the final layer, by letting each
auditor create its own private-key share and publish the corresponding share
of the public key. The “dependent part” of the public key is reconstituted as
the modular sum of the public shares. The “independent part” of the public key,
namely the large public matrix “A”, does not need to be shared and continues to
be pseudorandomly expanded from a public random seed that the auditors will
have agreed on. The private-key shares eventually revealed by the auditors can
be verified for correctness based on the corresponding public-key shares, before
the final decryption of the repetition layer takes place.
Our implementation is completely independent and does not borrow any code
from anywhere, other than a few lines for the canonical usage of AESNI.
6.3 Local-Scale Performance
Our test platform is a 2019 Dell XPS 13 Intel i7-8565U CPU, fully mitigated
in microcode and OS (Linux) against all known speculative execution/loading
attacks, and running a single core at 4.1GHz measured clock frequency. At the
240-bit target security level, using 1024-dimension lattices, the performance of
our IND-CCA2 subsystem (assuming 240-bit canary and 16-bit payload for the
DEM plaintext) is as follows:
– Public-key size: 93 kB
– Ciphertext overhead incl. canary: 2.3 kB
– Key generation time: 36 µs (0.036 s)
– Encryption time: 201 µs (0.000201 s)
– Decryption time: 133 µs (0.000133 s)
For the verifiable mix net application, except when the number of ballots is
extremely small, the processing time for each mix layer will be almost entirely
dominated by the time it takes to decrypt the incoming ballots. As one would
expect, the total decryption time for one layer of the mix net using a single core
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scales almost perfectly linearly with the number of ballots (see Section 6.4), and
we measure (on the same hardware as above):
– 7500 ballots in 1.02 s, or
– 1 million ballots in 132.22 s.
In practice, the decryption running time for a large number of independent
ciphertexts can be divided almost exactly by the number of available CPU cores.
6.4 Whole-System Performance
The random permutation of the ballots in each layer of the mix net does not add
any appreciable time to the mixing, as long as it can be assumed that the entire
set fits in random-access memory (normally a reasonable assumption). Likewise,
while lattice-based signatures are generally much more expensive than lattice-
based encryption, the overhead of issueing a single signature on the published
mix does not make any difference with a large number of ballots.
Therefore, when considering the performance of the entire mix net, the two
principal factors are the sequential nature of the encryption and decryption
operations (by the voter and the mix servers respectively), and the growth of
the multi-layer encrypted ballot with the number of layers. Clearly, the first
consideration introduces a linear factor in the total mixing time, since each mix
server must finish its mixing task on the entire set of ballots before certifying
the result and passing the baton to the next mix server.
The ciphertext growth is also linear in the number of layers (or equivalently,
mix servers). In our implementation at 240-bit security level, each layer adds an
overhead of 2.3 kB (consisting of 2.1 kB of KEM data plus 0.2 kB of redundancy,
to be added to the size of the plaintext, which in every layer except the first one
is the total size of the previous layer’s ciphertext). In theory, this makes the total
mixing time quadratic in the number n of mix servers as n → ∞. In practice,
however, the hybrid encryption and decryption running times are dominated
by the public-key KEM component, the processing of which at each layer is
independent of the size of the DEM hence the number of layers.
Our experiments (Table 1) show the evolution of encryption and decryption
running time of one layer of the ”onion” or encrypted ballot, in function of the
number of layers of encryption beneath it (level 0 indicates direct encryption of
the plaintext vote, while level 1,000,000 is clearly impractical and provided only
to show asymptotic behavior).
In practice, each layer corresponds to a different mixing server, so the total
number of layers will likely remain small (less or much less than 100). Nev-
ertheless, the experiments show that encryption and decryption times remain
essentially constant (per layer) far beyond the range of practical applications,
and that it is the size of the encrypted onions, rather than the time to encrypt
or decrypt them, that is likely to be a limiting factor. The asymptotic linearity
of encryption and decryption times (for each layer) only starts to show at very
high numbers of layers. We also note that only the total number of layers and
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Table 1: Encryption/decryption times and ciphertext size in function of layer height.
# layers ctx size (kB) encrypt time decrypt time
0 2,144 201 us 133 us
1 4,256 201 us 134 us
10 23,264 209 us 141 us
30 65,504 214 us 154 us
100 213,344 254 us 194 us
300 635,744 368 us 308 us
1,000 2,114,144 792 us 753 us
1,000,000 2,112,002,144 0.641 s 0.607 s
the total number of ciphertexts will matter, in terms of performance. How these
are partitioned between explicit and main mixers, as well as between actual and
trip wire ballots, has no significant impact on running time.
On the voter’s size, encrypting a complete onion even for an exceedingly
large 1000-layer mixnet would still require less than one second on most modern
commodity consumer hardware.
7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the main properties of the decryption mix net with
trip wires.
Verifiability and Accountability. We have formally proven that, even if all mix
servers are malicious, an adversary’s risk of being caught cheating is high.
More precisely, our accountability result implies that, if an adversary wants
to manipulate more than k honest inputs, then (at least) one misbehaving mix
server is identified with probability at least 1 − (nhonS /(nhonS + ntw))k+1, where
nhonS is the given number of honest senders and ntw is the given number of trip
wires per auditor. In particular, an adversary knows upfront that its risk of
being caught cheating converges exponentially fast against 1 in the number of
manipulated messages k.
Moreover, recall that during the main mixing, both the explicit mixing and
the repetition layer are still locked. Hence, even if the race between two candi-
dates A and B was very close, an adversary trying to manipulate the election
outcome in favor of A by swapping just a few votes from B to A, has to do this
“blindly”. In particular, the adversary may accidentally swap a message from A
to A. Hence, an adversary’s chance of successfully manipulating the outcome is
significantly reduced, independently of whether the adversary is caught cheating
or not.
Altogether, for applications like secure e-voting where misbehaving parties
have to face severe financial or legal penalties, an adversary knows a priori that
manipulating the mix net outcome would be completely unreasonable.
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External auditing. At a high level, the verification procedure of the trip wire
mix net can be regarded as an “integrity experiment” that is run between an
adversary (controlling all mix servers) and an external auditor who challenges
the adversary by “injecting” trip wires. If the adversary is able to manipulate (a
significant number of) honest inputs without touching one of the trip wires, then
the adversary wins. Our verifiability/accountability result (see above) provides
an upper bound for an adversary’s advantage in this experiment.
Obviously, the external auditor needs to be trusted for the integrity experi-
ment but this trust assumption is mitigated by two means. First, the auditor’s
role can easily be distributed among several auditors, only one of which needs
to be trusted. Second, the auditor opens its complete inner states once the in-
tegrity challenge has finished so that the correctness of its internal computation
can publicly be verified.
Privacy. The original purpose of employing a mix net is to break the individual
links between the senders and their plain input messages. This property is called
(message) privacy. Assuming one honest mix server and one honest auditor, the
trip wire mix net guarantees privacy. A formal proof of this statement can be
based on a sequence of games similar to the one of our accountability proof.
Post-quantum practicality. We experimentally benchmarked our verifiable mix
net scheme using an optimized post-quantum IND-CCA2-secure hybrid encryp-
tion scheme, consisting of a lattice-based CCA2-secure KEM, combined with
an AES256-based DEM/MAC. The benchmarks on our prototype demonstrate
that our verifiable mix net with trip wires is highly practical, even for large-scale
elections run entirely on commodity hardware.
Example: Practical PQ-secure e-voting. We now demonstrate how to put all
these pieces together. For this purpose, we consider two different kinds of elec-
tions, one with few and one with many voters. Clearly, for an election with few
voters, manipulating just a single message can have a major impact on the elec-
tion result with significant probability, whereas this is much less likely for an
election with many voters. In what follows, we exemplify how the decryption
mix net with trip wires can be set up to take this aspect into account.
Assume we have one election with 100 and one with 100,000 voters. We choose
ntw = 100, 000 for both elections. (For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all
voters are honest, i.e., nS = n
hon
S .) From the verifiability theorem, it follows
that the risk of being caught cheating is ≥ 99% both in the election with 100
voters for manipulating k ≥ 1 votes, and in the election with 100,000 voters for
manipulating k ≥ 7 votes. Therefore, in both cases, an adversary knows upfront
that tampering significantly with the election result is extremely risky.
At the same time, our benchmarks demonstrate that increasing ntw, and
hence tightening the verifiability tolerance, is practically negligible for appli-




We have presented the first practical and verifiable lattice-based decryption mix
net with external auditing which can be dropped into existing e-voting schemes.
Our mix net is fully implemented and supports arbitrarily many authorities.
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A Optimizations
As mentioned in Section 6, our implementation attempts to remain faithful to
Regev’s theoretical scheme [31], but rearranges it to optimize its computation.
In what follows, we summarize the salient points.
Our first optimization, which does deviate from the theoretical scheme, is,
rather than to publish the encryption key as a truly random matrix, we publish
a random seed from which the key is pseudo-randomly generated it using AES.
This is a trick used by several NIST submissions, including the “front runners”
still in play, but we have the opportunity to do it much faster without function
calls as explained in our technical report [7].
We also mentioned the use of a strictly data-independent integer Gaussian
sampler for generating the secret LWE noise. Using the Central Limit Theo-
rem, we build a novel circuit-based sampler, which, when paired with hardware-
accelerated AES, is able to produce i.i.d. integer samples of zero mean and small
19
fixed variance (e.g., σ ≈ 2) with provable 64-bit or 128-bit accuracy, suitable as
LWE noise, in a few clock cycles. 8 For comparison, we note that FrodoKEM
which also implements plain-LWE Regev encryption, samples from a cumula-
tive probability table of about 20-bit effective accuracy, and goes to lengths to
show that this is okay. Our equally fast sampler is far more accurate, and closely
matches the theoretical Regev scheme which requires high accuracy. It is also
data-independent (unlike table lookups whose access patterns could lead to cer-
tain cache-based side-channel leakage). The main downside of our sampler is
that it is highly inflexible and specifically suited for that particular usage. 9
Another extension to the textbook Regev scheme that we make, is the ad-
dition of an “all-or-nothing” transform such as [16] to obtain chosen-ciphertext
security, as is standard practice. Unlike [16], though, our all-or-nothing trans-
form does not cause invalid ciphertexts to be rejected, but only scrambled (or
randomized), as proposed in [6]. We do this to ensure that there truly is no data-
dependent test anywhere in the crypto code. We still get true CCA2 security,
and we can recover the classic explicit rejection behavior simply by adding and
testing a known string such as 0λ to the plaintext, i.e., outside of the crypto
code, to act as a “canary”.
Other that those differences, the mathematical functions computed by our
implementation are functionally very similar to the NIST submission FrodoKEM,
which both implement the Regev scheme. This allows us to borrow from its ex-
tensive security analyses and use similar lattice dimension parameters to tar-
get similar security levels. In particular, we were pleasantly surprised that the
FrodoKEM designers chose a Gaussian noise variance parameter close to that
which was forced on us by our optimized but inflexible sampler circuit design—
making their analysis a good match for our implementation. Nevertheless, to
err on the side of caution, we collected lattice hardness estimates from multiple
sources and, seeing that they loosely agreed with the FrodoKEM recommenda-
tions, we still rounded up the main lattice dimension to the higher power of 2.
Minor optimizations included selecting the modulus q = 216 “sizeof(short)”
for its ability to give us vectorized (SIMD) modular reductions for free. 10
We reiterate that our optimizations mostly affect not what we compute but
how we compute it. Unbound from the NIST rules, our code is not only faster, but
also safer, not in a cryptographic sense but against side-channel attacks. None
of our code borrows from the NIST contest; we merely frame this discussion in
relation with NIST to preempt any preconception than official standardization
would necessarily produce an optimal outcome.
8 Sampling accuracy is here meant in the sense of KL divergence to a true integer
Gaussian; clearly the output itself is just a small integer that fits in a few bits.
9 Describing and analyzing the sampler is very much out of the scope of this paper,
but it is one example of a very impactful optimization we could make that does not
involve what we compute, only how we do it.
10 FrodoKEM had nearly the same idea, but for reasons unclear chose q = 215 not 216,
perhaps because they could not use x86 64 vectorization intrinsics.
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